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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Orbiter Experiments (OEX) Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis _FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. Instructions
for PreDaration of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Experiments hardware.
The IOA analysis process utilized available OEX hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, \
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
The Orbiter Experiments (OEX) Program consists of a multiple set of
experiments for the purpose of gathering environmental and
aerodynamic data to develop more accurate ground models for Shuttle
performance and to facilitate the design of future spacecraft.
Several experiments have already flown and are not scheduled to fly
again. Others are still in development stages and have not been
manifested for a mission. This assessment will only address
currently manifested experiments and their support systems.
Specifically this list consists of:
O Shuttle Entry Air Data System (SEADS)
O Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS)
O Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX (FFSSO)
O Shuttle Infrared Laced Temperature Sensor (SILTS)
O Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP)
O Support System for OEX (SSO)
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each of
the six major subdivisions of the OEX. A summary of the number of
failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with Hardware
(HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality second.
+
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality :
Number
i/i
2
2/IR 2/2
3/IR I 3/2R I 3/3
- - 80
TOTAL
82
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality :
Number ljl12jiRl2j213jIR3j2Ri m I TOTAL2
There are only two potential critical items for the OEX, since
\,
the experiments only gather data for analysis post mlssion and
are totally independent systems except for power. Failure of any
experiment component usually only causes a loss of experiment
data and in no way jeopardizes the crew or mission, resulting the
large number of 3/3 assessments.
uJ
m
uJ
O
m
..J
Z
Z
Uw
x
m
L_
n_
X
IdJ
I--"
m
_es
er-
0
_E
w
i--
Figure 1 - OEX ANALYSIS SUMMARY OVERVIEW_
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2 • 1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 OEX Ground Rules and Assumptions
The OEX ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B. The experiments specific groundrules were
defined to limit the analysis to single failed parts for each
failure.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Orbiter experiments (OEX) consists of various sets of hardware
required to obtain precise data for physics, aerodynamics,
thermodynamics, structures, and materials on the orbiter in a flight
and orbital environment. Data for the OEX may be from existing
sensors in the operational instrumentation (OI), from sensors in the
development flight instrumentation (DFI), from new OEX unique
sensors, or from combinations of the above. Data recording of the
OEX data is provided by the payload recorder, operations recorder,
DFI recorder, OEX recorder, the MADS recorder, or combinations
thereof. Columbia, OV-102, is the main test-bed for the OEX.
Special unique structural interfaces are required for SEADS, SUMS
and SILTS, and thus these experiments are only on OV-102. The ACIP
experiment can be fitted to any orbiter.
The Orbiter Experiments consists of the following experiments and
support systems:
i• Shuttle Entry Air Data System (SEADS) experiment is
designed to reference air data (angle of attack, and angle
of sideslip) during the entire free-stream, dynamic
pressure, atmospheric flight envelope of the orbiter
(Entry). Both air pressure and temperature measurements
are made to determine temperature compensation of the
pressure measurements• The system comprises of 28 pressure
transducers (0- to 5- volt outputs), eight temperature
sensors (RTD's) which require signal conditioning, and six
radiometers which also require signal conditioning; all
located on the nose cone of the orbiter (Figure 2). 14
pressure ports, each containing two pressure transducers,
are flush-mounted orifices arranged in a cruciform pattern.
The pressure distribution obtained from these ports are
used to measure dynamic pressure, vehicle attitude, and
state.
• The Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS)
measures the density and composition of the Earth
atmosphere beginning approximately 1 hour prior to orbiter
reentry and continues down to an external inlet pressure of
5.18 torr (about IISK Feet). It will provide total
atmosphere quantities in regions below that traversed by
Earth satellites and above that regularly assessed by
ground launched meter.logical missions. The SUMS
experiment is made up of a gas inlet system and a
pressurized enclosure containing a mass spectrometer and
electronic control system. Data is fed to a PCM-slave
which processes and converts it into a format that can be
transmitted to the PCM master then to the recorder. The
SUMS and PCM-slave are mounted on the bulkhead at the
forward end of the orbiter nose landing gear wheel well
with the inlet system fitted to the lower fuselage surface
in front of the nose wheel well (Figure 3).
6
. Part of the Forward Fuselage Support System for Orbiter
Experiments (FFSSO) provides for the collection and
handling of experiment data (SEADS and SUMS), while the
other part provides sensors for the measurement of static
air pressure. Six static pressure ports located on the
forward fuselage contain two pressure transducers each used
to remove the effects of dynamic pressure (from SEADS) as
functions of angle of attack and yaw. In addition, there
are six temperature measurements, one for each pair of
pressure transducers, for temperature compensation of the
measured pressures. There is also one temperature sensor
on the PCM slave to verify its health. Data is fed to the
PCM slave in the nose wheel well, to the PCM master, and
then to the recorder. The FFSSO consists also of all the
electrical cabling between transducers, sensors, PCM slave
and PCM master (Figure 4).
. Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor (SILTS)
experiment is used to obtain high-resolution temperatures
of the orbiter upper (leeside) surfaces during entry
aerodynamic flight. An infrared (IR) camera, mounted in a
pod on top of the vertical fin, is used to produce thermal
maps on the orbiter upper surface. These data will improve
orbiter operational capability through reduction of the
upper thermal protection system (TPS) which will reduce
weight and refurbishment costs. Experiment equipment
mounted within the pod includes pressure system module,
data and control (D&C) module, dome assembly/IR camera, and
window protection plugs (Figure 5). The pressure system
(GN2) provides coolant for the windows and IR camera and
also provides pressure for window plug release. The IR
camera alternately views the forward fuselage, black body,
and port wing during a 7-second cycle, controlled by
camera pointing circuitry in the D&C module. The D&C
module also provides an output data interface between the
IR camera and the OEX recorder via the ICM/SCM. Heaters in
the pod are activated by the crew after launch to regulate
the pod temperature between 60 and 80 degrees F
throughout the mission. During the entry switch
configuration, the crew will enable the experiment switches
so that it will receive a start command at entry interface
(EI).
. The Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP) is
to collect and measure the accelerations (linear in X, Y,
and Z and angular in roll, pitch and yaw) and rates (roll,
pitch, and yaw) of the orbiter. The aerodynamic forces
cause the vehicle to slow down from orbital velocity to
landing speed during reentry. The data collected by ACIP
is of greater resolution than the standard orbiter onboard
instrumentation. The ACIP hardware, mounted in a self-
contained package, consists of a Triaxial
Accelerometer/Gyro Instrument Package (TAGIP), Triaxial
Angular Accelerometer (TAA), Triaxial Vibration Sensor
.(TVS), Data-Handling Electronics (DHE), and Mini Data-
Handling Electronics (MDHE). The package is located
beneath the payload bay insulation liner near the
longitudinal center of gravity (Figure 6). The High-
Resolution Accelerometer Package (HIRAP) was added as a
separate major subassembly. It provides a third set of
triaxial accelerometer sensors to complement the TAGIP and
TAA. Other ACIP associated equipment are the Pulse Code
Modulation (PCM) Master and a PCM slave. The PCM master
handles data from SEADS, SUMS and FFSSO as well as ACIP.
The PCM slave handles the analog data from ACIP to the PCM
master (Figure 7). Data from these experiments is then
routed to the ICM/SCM then to the OEX recorder. Heaters
are installed on the package to maintain temperature
greater than 45±5 degrees F during orbital flight.
Minimal crew participation is required, since the
experiment operations is performed by commands from the
ground. Operation is required during ascent, entry and
specific orbital tests.
The objective of the Support System for Orbiter Experiments
(SSO) is to provide control, conditioning, handling and
recording of the experiments data. The SSO consists of the
OEX Recorder, a control module [either the interface
control module (ICM) or the system control module (SCM)],
and the wiring and cabling. The equipment is located in
the crew compartment Volume D. As a result, the SSO is
removed on a Spacelab mission, since it requires this
space. The control module is the primary interface
between the OEX recorder and experiment instruments, and
the orbiter (Figure 8). It controls the OEX recorder
speed, record mode, and track selection along with
experiment power and mode. It is controlled via uplink
commands except for power and it has no telemetry. The
OEX recorder records all the OEX experiments data and
can only be accessed post-mission through ground support
equipment.
3.2 Interfaces and Location
The Orbiter Experiments hardware, for this analysis,
consists of four experiments and two support systems. The
interfaces for the OEX are relatively simple in that there
is a limited number of interfaces with subsystems on the
orbiter. Most experiments are controlled via uplink command
through the Communications System then through the Data
Processing System (DPS) to the experiment. Timing functions
are fed into PCMs for comparison and update to internal
time. Control surface measurements are input into the ACIP
experiment for comparison of their movement to the sensed
aerodynamics of the orbiter. Lastly, a few switches are
available on panel A7 for manual control of some of the
experiments. The location of each of the experiments,
support systems, and controls is shown in Figure 9.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure i0 illustrates the hierarchy of the OEX experiments and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 2 through 8 comprise
the detailed system representation.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the two major subdivisions
of the OEX. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions
and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent
paragraphs.
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
SEADS
SUMS
FFSSO
SILTS
ACIP
SSO
TOTAL
1/i
2
2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
4
16
5
26
22
?
8O
TOTAL
6
16
5
26
22
7
82
Of the 83 failure modes analyzed, 2 failures were determined to
result in loss of crew or vehicle, and none were determined to
result in loss of mission. A summary of the potential critical
items is presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross
reference between each potential critical item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
SEADS:
1/l
2
2/IR
2/2 1 3/IR
3/2R TOTAL
2
19
4.1 Analysis Results - SEADS
4.2
4.3
4.4
The SEADS experiment consists of pressure transducers,
radiometers, and temperature sensors located in the nose cone
of the orbiter. Two CIL's and two PCIs were identified and
listed in Appendix D.
Analysis Results - SUMS
The SUMSexperiment consists of a gas inlet system, a mass
spectrometer, and an electronic control system. No CILs nor
PCIs were identified on this experiment.
Analysis Results - FFSSO
The FFSSO consists of pressure transducers, temperature sensor,
and a PCM slave #2 unit. No CILs nor PCIs were identified on
this support system.
Analysis Results - SILTS
The SILTS experiment consists of a dome assembly/IR camera, a
pressure system module, and a data & control module. No CILs
nor PCIs were identified on this experiment.
4.5 Analysis Results - ACIP
4.6
The ACIP experiment consists of several acrodynamic monitoring
pieces of equipment (TAGIP, TAA, TVS, DHE, MDHE, and HIRAP).
In addition, other support equipment consists of a PCM Master
and a PCM Slave. No CILs nor PCIs were identified on this
experiment.
Analysis Results - SSO
The SSO consists of an ICM/SCM and an OEX recorder.
nor PCIs were identified on this support system.
No CILs
2O
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
ACIP
CIL
CMD
COMM
CRIT
D&C
DCM
DFI
DHE
DPS
EI
F
F
FFSSO
FLCA
FMEA
ft
FWD
GFE
GMT
GN2
GSE
HIRAP
HTR
HW
ICM
IOA
IR
JSC
MADS
MDAC
MDHE
MDM
N2
NASA
NSTS
OEX
OI
OPS
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PWR
RCDR
RTD
SCM
SEADS
- Aerodynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package
- Critical Items List
- Command, Commander
- Communications
- Criticality
- Displays and Controls
- Display and Control Module
- Development Flight Instrumentation
- Data-Handling Electronics
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Entry Interface
- Fahrenheit
- Functional
- Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX
- Forward Load Control Assembly
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Feet
- Forward
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Greenwich Mean Time
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Ground Support Equipment
- High-Resolution Accelerometer Package
- Heater
- Hardware
- Interface Control Module
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Infrared
- Johnson Space Center
- Modular Auxiliary Data System
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Mini Data-Handling Electronics
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Nitrogen
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Orbiter Experiments
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operations Sequence
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Power
- Recorder
- Resistance Temperature Device
- System Control Module
- Shuttle Entry Air Data System
A-I
ACRONYMS
SI LTS
SSO
STS
SUMS
TAA
TAGIP
TPS
TVS
- Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor
- Support System for OEX
- Space Transportation System
- Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer
- Triaxial Angular Accelerometer
- Triaxial Accelerometer/Gyro Instrument Package
- Thermal Protection System
- Triaxial Vibration Sensor
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APPENDIX B
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B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M__C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation o_ FM_A/CI_, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
•
•
•
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
B-4
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•
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE : Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 OEX-Speoific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level of
the OEX subsystem. The analysis considered the worst case effects
of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
i. Experiments which develop problems which do not impact the
operation and safety of the orbiter will be classifed
Criticality 3.
Rationale: Loss of mission will refer to the overall orbiter
mission not individual elements.
2. Analysis was only conducted on present experiments and support
systems planned for future missions.
Rationale: Experiments and support systems flown in the part
which are not manifested on future mission are
excluded from FMEA/CIL analysis.
3. OASIS Experiment excluded from this analysis.
Rationale: OASIS is considered a payload by the Orbiter Project
Office and is thus excluded from this analysis.
B-6
APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and the
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206 t Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL L I0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom o$ each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
C-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: i00
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEADS NOSE CAP ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SEADS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE CAP
V577-399252
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BURN THROUGH MAY RESULT DURING ENTRY CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND/OR CREW.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OEX FLIGHT: I/I
I01 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONE
PRESSURE PORT (14)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CRACK, BREAK LOOSE FROM NOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SEADS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT : I/1 AOA : I/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER :
NOSE CONE
MC621-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEAT DURING RE-ENTRY MAY SEVERELY DAMAGE VEHICLE. EVEN THOUGH
ITEM IS REDUNDANT, FAILURE OF ANY ONE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSUREPORT (14)
RESTRICTEDFLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) SEADS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [
LOCATION: NOSE CONE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0007
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DYNAMICPRESSUREAND TEMPERATUREFOR EXPERIMENTSYSTEM.
REDUNDANCYWILL AVOID TOTAL LOSS OF DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGOSYSTEMSMANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORTDATE 8/3/87 C-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURETRANSDUCERS(28)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) SEADSEXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
NOSE CONE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DYNAMIC DATA TO PCM SLAVE # 2.
EXPERIMENT.
INCOMPLETE DATA FOR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTANCETEMPERATUREDEVICE (8)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) SEADS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE CONE
ME449-0160-0008
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TEMPERATURE DATA WHICH COMPENSATES THE DYNAMIC PRESSURE
READING. ALSO INDICATES HEALTH OF INSULATION INSIDE NOSE CONE.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADIOMETER(6)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) SEADS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:- 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE CONE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TEMPERATURE DATA USED TO MEASURE DYNAMIC PRESSURE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMSINSTRUMENTASSEMBLY
STRUCTURALFAILURE, SUPPORTLOOSE/BREAKS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: Jo COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE WHEEL WELL
3290600
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF SUMS DATA.
ON DEPLOYMENT.
POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH NOSE GEAR
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMSINSTRUMENTASSEMBLY
INTERNAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) SUMSEXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
NOSE WHEEL WELL
3290600
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUMS DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 202
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSUREORIFICE
RESTRICTEDFLOW
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: LOWER FUSELAGE SURFACE FORWARD OF NOSE WHEEL WELL
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUMS DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET SYSTEM
RESTRICTEDFLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) SUMSEXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
OMORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUMS DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-II
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET SYSTEM
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF INPUT,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUMS DATA OR DAMAGE TO SUMS INSTRUMENT ASSEMBLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET SYSTEM
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUMS DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
51o5187
OEX/EPD&C
206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS ION PUMP POWER (FLC-3)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORB!T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
CAUSES: RELAY OPEN, BAD PIN CONNECTION, POWER SUPPLY FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO PUMP RESULTING IN LOSS OF DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o5/87
OEX/EPD&C
207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS ION PUMP POWER (FLC-3)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO PUMP RESULTING IN LOSS OF DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o5/87
OEX/EPD&C
2O8
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS INSTRUMENT POWER (FLC-3)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: RELAY OPEN, BAD PIN CONNECTION, POWER SUPPLY FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO MONITOR AND CONTROL EXPERIMENT.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
5/o5/87
OEX/EPD&C
209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS INSTRUMENT POWER (FLC-3)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER RESULTING IN LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
5/o5/87
OEX/EPD&C
210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS VACCUUM MAINTENANCE POWER (FLC-3)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: RELAY OPEN, BAD PIN CONNECTION, POWER SUPPLY FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VACUUM RESULTING IN LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5105187
OEX/EPD&C
211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS VACUUM MAINTENANCE POWER (FLC-3)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER RESULTING IN LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
5/o5/87
OEX/EPD&C
212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCM TO SUMS COMM. - PCM CLOCK
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
PDS-700-10
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VAMS NOT COMMANDED TO OPERATE RESULTING IN LOSS OF DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o5/8 
OEX/EPD&C
213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCM TO SUMS COMM. - DATA STROBE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUMCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
PDS-700-10
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PCM READ FUNCTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/o5/87
OEX/EPD&C
214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS TO PCM COMM. - DIGITAL DATA
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 3290600
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DIGITAL WORD BITS DATA RESULTING IN LOSS OF EXPERIMENT
DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/05/87
OEX/EPD&C
215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMS TO PCM COMM. - ANALOG DATA
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SUMS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
3290600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HOUSEKEEPING ANALOG DATA RESULTING IN LOSS OF EXPERIMENT
DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PULSE CODEMODULATOR- SLAVE #2
STRUCTURALFAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FORWARD FUSELAGE SUPPORT SYSTEM (FFSS0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE WHEEL WELL
PDS-700-10
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF SEADS AND/OR SUMS DATA POSSIBLE INTERFERANCE
WITH NOSE GEAR ON DEPLOYMENT.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PULSE CODEMODULATOR- SLAVE #2
INTERNAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) FORWARDFUSELAGESUPPORTSYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
NOSE WHEEL WELL
PDS-700-10
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SEADS AND/OR SUMS DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 302 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STATIC PRESSURETRANSDUCER(12)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FORWARD FUSELAGE SUPPORT SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME449-0178-0104, ME449-0178-2101
c [
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF STATIC PRESSURE DATA TO SUMS AND SEADS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DEVICE (7)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FORWARD FUSELAGE SUPPORT SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
ME449-0160-0008
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TEMPERATURE DATA MAY INVALIDATE SUMS AND SEADS DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 304 ABORT:
ITEM: TEMPERATURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (8)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FORWARD FUSELAGE SUPPORT SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
STA 4760023 ME-0010
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DATA MAY INVALIDATE SEADS DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SYSTEM AND DCM MOUNT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
2) SILTS EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
SIL416149-1H-2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GN2 TANKS COULD BREAK FREE AND RUPTURE. THIS WOULD AFFECT FLOW
OF GAS TO EXPERIMENT CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF CAMERA DATA.
REFERENCES: V565-707001, ICD-3-0048-02
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 TANKS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
SILTS EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL FIN POD
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GN2 TANKS RUPTURE OR LEAK AFFECTING FLOW TO GAS TO EXPERIMENT,
CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF CAMERA DATA. THIS RUPTURE MAY AT WORSE
CAUSE LOSS OF SOME TILES ON VERTICAL FIN, WHICH HAS PROVEN NOT TO
BE OF CONCERN.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILL VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c E ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF GN2 FROM ONE TANK.
GAS FOR EXPERIMENT.
OTHER TANK WILL PROVIDE
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 403 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RUPTURE DISK
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST : J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEMS, SILTS
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL FIN POD
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE CAN BUILD UP IN TANK, HOWEVER TANK BURST PRESSURE 3
TIMES GREATER THAN LOAD PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 404
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RUPTURE DISK
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF GN2 FROM ONE TANK.
GAS FOR EXPERIMENT.
OTHER TANK WILL PROVIDE
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 405 ABORT:
ITEM: FILTER
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURESYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL CAUSE RESTRICTED FLOW FROM ONE TANK, BUT OTHER TANK IS
AVAILABLE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
5/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
406
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING SOLENOIDVALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL FIN POD
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF THIS PRESSURE SYSTEM FOR
EXPERIMENT. OTHER SYSTEM AVAILABLE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 407 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS PRESSURE SYSTEM FOR EXPERIMENT.
AVAILABLE.
OTHER SYSTEM
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDACID: 408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FILTER
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTEDFLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS WILL RESULT IN NO N2 FOR EXPERIMENT. LOSS OF EXPERIMENT.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 5/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 409
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL FIN POD
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO N2 AVAILABLE TO EXPERIMENT. LOSS OF EXPERIMENT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 410
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECKVALVES
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURESYSTEMS, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO N2 AVAILABLE TO COOL CAMERA. LOSS OF EXPERIMENT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 411
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: FILTER
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO WINDOW COOLING NOR PRESSURE TO PIN PULLERS.
EXPERIMENT.
LOSS OF
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 412
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSUREREDUCTIONCOIL
EXTERNALLEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURESYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 -AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
I2hNDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 TO WINDOWS AND PIN PULLERS. LOSS OF EXPERIMENT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 413
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSUREREDUCTIONCOIL
RESTRICTEDFLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LA/_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO N2 TO WINDOWS AND PIN PULLERS. LOSS OF EXPERIMENT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 415
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURE SYSTEM, SILTS
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 FLOW TO WINDOWS CAUSING WINDOW OVERHEATING AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 416 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PIN PULLERS
EXTERNALLEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRESSURESYSTEM, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL FIN POD
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 FLOW TO PIN PULLERS WILL RESULT IN WINDOW PLUGS NOT
BEING PULLED. LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
417
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER SWITCH, SILTS
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THERMAL CONTROL, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7A2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, BROKEN CONNECTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEMPERATURE NOT MAINTAINED FOR EXPERIMENT. DATA LOSS OR INVALID.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
418
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT (3)
FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) THERMAL SYSTEM, SILTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEMPERATURE NOT MAINTAINED FOR EXPERIMENT. DATA LOSS OR INVALID.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 419 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATERS (3)
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THERMAL CONTROL, SILTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAMERA, DCM AND PRESSURE SYSTEM MAY NOT OPERATE PROPERLY IF
TEMPERATURE NOT MAINTAINED. PARTIAL TO TOTAL LOSS OF EXPERIMENT
DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, 7.1; STS 83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 420
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DATA CONTROL MODULE (DCM)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SILTS EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL FIN POD
PART NUMBER: SIL416120-1G-2
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEGRADED OR LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: V56-707001, ICD-3-0048-02, OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/21/87
OEX/EPD&C
421
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID RELAY, DCM
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DATA CONTROL MODULE
2) SILTS EXPERIMENT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 BEFORE NEEDED, RESULTING IN LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, ICD-3-0048-02
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/21/87
OEX/EPD&C
422
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID RELAY, DCM
FAILS TO SWITCH
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DATA CONTROL MODULE
2) SILTS EXPERIMENT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
N2 WILL NOT BE SUPPLIED TO COOL EXPERIMENT RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, ICD-3-0048-02
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 5/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 423
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WINDOW ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BREAKS/CRACKS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DOME ASSEMBLY
SILTS EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
LD416361
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCREASE IN DOME TEMPERATURE AND POSSIBLE CAMERA DAMAGE.
EXPERIMENT DATA.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES: V565-707001, ICD-3-0048-02
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 424 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CAMERA ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DOME ASSEMBLY
SILTS EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL FIN POD
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITHOUT GOOD CAMERA OPERATION, EXPERIMENT DATA WILL BE DEGRADED
OR LOSS.
REFERENCES: V565-707001, ICD-3-0048-02
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OEX FLIGHT:
425 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLACKBODY ASSEMBLY
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DOME ASSEMBLY
SILTS EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL FIN POD
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BLACK BODY RESULTING IN REDUCED QUALITY OF EXPERIMENT
DATA.
REFERENCES: V565-707001, ICD-3-0048-02, OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87
OEX/EPD&C
426
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SILTS ENABLE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) SILTS EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: A7 PANEL
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXPERIMENT CAN STILL BE ENABLED BY GROUND THROUGH TELEMETRY.
REFERENCES: V565-707001, ICD-3-0048-02, OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 500 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TRIAXIAL ACCELEROMETER/GYRO INSTRUMENT PACKAGE
FAILURE MODE: PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
2359220
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCOMPLETE DATA FOR ACIP EXPERIMENT.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 501 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRIAXIAL ANGULAR ACCELEROMETER
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
2359220
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCOMPLETE DATA FOR ACIP EXPERIMENT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-56
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRIAXIAL VIBRATION SENSOR
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
2359220
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCOMPLETE DATA FOR ACIP EXPERIMENT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
HIGH RESOLUTION LINEAR ACCELEROMETER PACKAGE
PARTIAL OUTPUT
SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTONLEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [ ] c [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
PAYLOAD BAY
3291560
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCOMPLETE DATA FOR ACIP EXPERIMENT
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DATA HANDLING ELECTRONICS
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
2359220
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCOMPLETE DATA FOR ACIP EXPERIMENT. THIS SYSTEM CHANGES BOTH
ACIP AND HIRAP SENSOR SIGNALS TO 14-BIT RESOLUTION. LOSS OF
SYSTEM WILL CAUSE LOSS OF RAW DATA AND HOUSEKEEPING DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MINI DATA HANDLING ELECTRONICS
PARTIAL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 2359250
] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROL SURFACE SIGNALS AND ONE RCS PRESSURE SIGNAL FOR
ACIP EXPERIMENT.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OEX FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 506 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCM SLAVE
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
2359218
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACIP HOUSEKEEPING DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCM MASTER
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 2359221
] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, LOOSE PIN(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACIP, SEADS, SUMS AND/OR FFSO DATA TO RECORDER.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER GMT #8
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK
MC456-0060-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, PCM MASTER HAS ITS OWN INTERNAL TIMING.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
5O9
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE-ACIP ON CMD
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COMAND TO POWER UP ACIP EXPERIMENT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE-ACIP ON CMD
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA IF "ON" COMMAND CHANNEL IS
DAMAGED.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER-42
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP ON CMD
2) ACIP EXPERIMENT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00
B[ ] C[
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ACIP EXPERIMENT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER-42
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) ACIP ON CMD
2 ) ACIP EXPERIMENT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY
MC450-0017-II00
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWERS ON ACIP EXPERIMENT WHEN NOT NEEDED, CAUSING USE OF ORBITER
POWER.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
g)
ACIP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
ACIP EXPERIMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RII
RWR8051211FR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEATER FUNCTION TO ACIP PACKAGE WHICH COULD AFFECT
EXPERIMANT DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACIP HEATER SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RII
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEATER FUNCTION TO ACIP PACKAGE WHICH COULD AFFECT
EXPERIMENT DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-69
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACIP HEATER SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RII
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B [ ] c [
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT-EXTRA USE OF ORBITER POWER.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER-41
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEATER FUNCTION TO ACIP PACKAGE WHICH COULD AFFECT
EXPERIMENT DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
OEX/EPD&C
517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER-41
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY
MC450-0017-II00
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT-EXTRA USE OF ORBITER POWER.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
518
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) FWD LCA 3
2) ACIP EXPERIMENT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO PCM MASTER AND SLAVE UNITS.
ACIP, SUMS, SEADS AND FFSO DATA.
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
519
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FWD LCA 3
2) ACIP EXPERIMENT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT-EXTRA USE OF ORBITER POWER.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-74
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
520
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE-ACIP CALIB
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CALIBRATE COMMAND TO ACIP. COULD INVALIDATE DATA.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE,ACIP CALIB
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACIP EXPERIMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF COMMAND TO CALIBRATE ACIP WHICH COULD INVALIDATE
DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OEX FLIGHT: 3/3
600 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO OPERATE
OEX RECORDER
ERRATIC OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYSLEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) OEX SS0
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
PART NUMBER: V565-763200
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL OEX EXPERIMENT DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
601
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID RELAY
FAILS TO SWITCH
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ICM/SCM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROL TO DRIVER WHICH POWERS THE PCM MASTER AND SLAVE.
LOSS OF POWER TO PCM WILL CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID RELAY
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ICM/SCM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RECORDING TIME AND ORBITER ENERGY UNNECESSARILY.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
603
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE-OEX PCM/RCDR ON
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ICM/SCM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551
c [
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COMMAND TO POWER PCM AND RECORDER.
OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-80
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
604
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE-OEX PCM/RCDR ON
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ICM/SCM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRI_ICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF COMMAND TO POWER UP PCM AND RECORDER WHICH WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF DATA.
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-81
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
OEX/EPD&C
6O5
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ICM/SCM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
PART NUMBER: RWR8051211FR
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COMMAND TO POWER PCM AND RECORDER.
OF EXPERIMENT DATA.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-0546A
REPORT DATE 08/10/87 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 606
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSDUCERS, SENSORS (INSTRUMENTATION)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) OEX RECORDER
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT VOLUME D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL SENSORS ON THE OEX SYSTEM ARE FOR DOWNLIST DATA.
WILL ONLY RESULT IN LOSS OF RECORDER DATA.
FAILURE
REFERENCES: OEX CARGO SYSTEMS MANUAL, STS-83-O546A
REPORT DATE 8/3/87 C-83

APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
i00
I01
SEADS Nose Cap Assembly
Pressure Ports
Structural Failure
Structural Failure
D-I
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